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D a g e s t a n
D M I TR I  M A K A R O V
Calls for, and practical attempts of introduction of the
s h a r i a laws are the core issue of the contemporary
process of Islamic resurgence in the North Caucasus. In
1997 the Chechen Republic officially proclaimed itself
an Islamic State living by the s h a r i a. Despite some short-
comings of the Chechen experience in this respect, the
idea of the s h a r i aÕs enactment is nevertheless getting
more public attention and proponents in other north-
Caucasian republics, Dagestan in particular.
E n a c t i n g
the S h a r i a L a w s
in a Dagestani
V i l l a ge*Historically, Dagestan has been the majorcentre of Islamic culture in the whole NorthCaucasus. Through the years of Soviet rule peo-
ples of Dagestan, Avars and Dargins in particu-
lar managed to keep their Islamic traditions
alive. That is why the difficulties of the transi-
tion to the post-Soviet development and the
aggravating crisis of Dagestani society, espe-
cially its spiritual-ethical dimension, provoked a
reaction with discernible Islamic overtones. The
governmentÕs inability to put an end to the
spread of crime, drug addiction, alcoholism,
prostitution and other moral deviations little
known to DagestanisÕ life-style before p e r e s t r o i-
k a, draws many people to consider Islamic reli-
gious and juridical principles as a means to
societyÕs spiritual and moral recovery, and pos-
sibly a way to the establishment of more right-
eous socio-political order.
There are two major forces pushing the cause
of Islamization in Dagestan: the official Muslim
clergy represented in the Spiritual Board of the
Muslims of Dagestan (SBMD) and adherents of
Islamic fundamentalism, generally but not
quite correctly called ÔWahhabisÕ. They are bit-
terly opposed to each other. The SBMD is con-
trolled by followers of sufi sheikhs and thus
advocates the ideology of Sufi brotherhoods
(ÔtariqatÕ), which has been dominant in Dages-
tan since the early Middle-Ages. So, official cler-
gy condemns ÔwahhabismÕ, whose presence
became noticeable in Dagestan only since the
late 1980s, as a an ideology ÔimportedÕ (from
Saudi Arabia), which is absolutely alien to
Dagestani traditions and which is nothing more
than a tool of dividing the Muslims and a reli-
gious disguise for those seeking political power
and personal wealth.
On their part, the ÔWahhabisÕ blame the Sufi
ÔtariqatÕ Islam for having distorted the authen-
tic Islamic beliefs and practices established by
the Prophet Muhammad, for various reasons.
One reason is because the sufis allegedly wor-
ship their sheikhs (saints) alongside Allah which
is incompatible with the basic Islamic principle
of monotheism (t a w h i d); another reason being
that they have introduced many new traditions
that did not exist in early Islam and left out
many others that are essential to Islamic doc-
trine (such as j i h a d). Criticizing the cooperation
between the SBMD and Dagestani authorities,
the ÔWahhabisÕ accuse the tariqatist Sheikhs of
selling the religion to the ÔunbelievingÕ secular
g o v e r n m e n t .
Despite this rivalry between ÔtariqatistsÕ and
ÔWahhabisÕ, the results of their accumulated
efforts leads to further Islamization of the soci-
ety. Yet, while the official clergy and sufi broth-
erhoods are concerned mostly with building
their institutional infrastructure and religious
propaganda through the opening of new
mosques, ÔmadressasÕ, Islamic charitable foun-
dations, publishing religious books and news-
papers, celebrating religious holidays and orga-
nizing pilgrimages to Mecca; the ÔWahhabisÕ
skilfully combine this agenda with practical
efforts to introduce Islamic regulations into
daily life of some local, and mostly rural com-
munities. Although institutional resources and
access to mass-media are relatively more limit-
ed for the ÔWahhabisÕ, they undeniably hold the
initiative in practical, on-the-ground Islamiza-
t i o n .
In sharp contrast to the behaviour of the
SBMD leaders who, just a few years ago had
made an abortive attempt to convince the gov-
ernment to declare Friday an official holiday in
Dagestan, and still tend to appeal to the
authorities on every small issue; the ÔWahhabisÕ
in recent years have persistently worked on
establishing the Islamic order in regions where
they feel most self-assured. Thus, the contours
of Islamic enclaves in some villages of Buinaksk
and other districts have been in the making
since 1995-96. In August, the villages of Kara-
makhi, Chabanmakhi, and Qadar, proclaimed Ôa
separate Islamic territory governed by s h a r i a
lawsÕ. By the beginning of September this con-
flict was resolved through an agreement
between the ÔWahhabisÕ and the authorities,
which brought the villages back under the
political and administrative control of the gov-
ernment. The agreement tacitly accepted the
socio-cultural hegemony of the Islamists at the
local level, leaving them free to keep the s h a r i a
rulings applicable in the villages.
No less challenging for the government, a dif-
ferent pattern of Islamization can be observed
in Kirovaul, a village in the Kyzilyurt district
(about 50 km. west of Makhachkala). Kirovaul is
one of those many villages that emerged in
1940-70 due to the enforced resettlement of
mountainous a u l s Õ dwellers in the plains of
Northern Dagestan. It has some 3 000 inhabi-
tants, almost all of them Avars. 70% of them
came from the village of Sildi, Tzumada r a y i o n,
and the rest came from other Tzumada villages. 
By the early 1990s, its population had also
become divided into adherents of traditional
ÔtariqatÕ Islam and ÔWahhabisÕ. The ÔSildisÕ
turned out to be more disposed to fundamen-
talist ideology, and by now almost half of them
are considered ÔWahhabisÕ, while there are vir-
tually no ÔWahhabisÕ among those coming from
other villages. Thus, the ÔWahhabisÕ make up
roughly 1/3 of KirovaulÕs population.
Ideological controversy could not be avoid-
ed. Religious disputes had been occurring even
during prayer times in the village mosque. To
prevent these disputes from disrupting the
prayers, it was eventually decided to pray sepa-
rately: the ÔWahhabisÕ were to stay at the exist-
ing mosque, and the ÔtariqatistsÕ began to con-
struct a new mosque for themselves. The solu-
tion had been negotiated peacefully and satis-
fied both parties. Since then the relationship
between the followers of the two trends has
been quite normal. It is amazing that the village
madressa ÔSildiÕ makes room for both ÔWahhabiÕ
and ÔtariqatÕ scholars teaching there side by
side. Contacts are also normally maintained in
everyday life. Children from Wahhabist and
tariqatist families play together, while in many
other Dagestani settlements they are dragged
into their parentsÕ quarrels (for instance, the
ÔWahhabisÕ are often accused of inciting their
children to tease tariqatistsÕ children by calling
them Ôm u s h r i k sÕ, meaning ÔpolytheistsÕ). One
possible explanation of such unusual mutual
tolerance is the fact that the majority of
tariqatists in Kirovaul follow Naqshbandi
Sheikh Tadjuddin of Khasavyurt and not Sheikh
Said-Efendi of Chirkey, whose murids ( d i s c i p l e s )
control the SBMD and are consequently much
more hostile to Wahhabis.
Recourse to Islamic regulations is not some-
thing absolutely new in Kirovaul, whose inhab-
itants have kept much of the traditional moun-
tain dwellersÕ respect for religious values. Sell-
ing of alcoholic beverages had been virtually
banned for several years. But this did not pre-
vent alcohol abuse from spreading. Intoxicated
persons were quite often seen in the streets
using foul language and provoking quarrels.
Besides, drug dealers from neighbouring
Chechnya started to come to the village, selling
ÔanashaÕ (a sort of narcotic) and recruiting local,
unemployed youngsters for their criminal net-
works. Thefts of livestock, crops and personal
property have become frighteningly frequent.
Families have been increasingly anxious about
the moral integrity of women and young girls.
Local police paid almost no attention to peo-
pleÕs requests to restore safety and order,
which led many village dwellers to believe that
the police were corrupt and unreliable.
It is against such a background that the gath-
ering of Kirovaul inhabitants voted in May 1998
for the establishment of the s h a r i a court and
s h a r i a guard to fight alcohol and drug abuse,
theft and moral laxity. Tariqatists and Wahhabis
got equal representation among the 6 judges
(3 most competent scholars from each side)
and the guard, which consisted of some 40-50
people. Leaflets informing the population
about the principles of the s h a r i a s t r u c t u r e s Õ
activity were posted on the mosquesÕ walls.
Then the s h a r i a guard started patrolling the vil-
lage streets, especially at night.
All those picked up in the street for appear-
ing drunk or committing theft are being
brought before the court, which determines an
appropriate punishment in accordance with
the s h a r i a. Of course, such measures as the cut-
ting off of hands or throwing stones have never
been applied, and the only punishment in use
is beating with a stick. The number of blows
depends upon the nature of the transgression.
There are no public floggings in Kirovaul. All
punishments are executed in the madressa
building in the presence of the judges and
guard members only. However, the names of
the punished become immediately known all
over the village.
At least within the first month of its activity
the s h a r i a guard did not face serious resistance
on the part of the transgressors or their fami-
lies. On the contrary, some women suffering
from their husbandÕs addiction to alcohol, start-
ed urging the s h a r i a guard to step in. Most of
the respondents in Kirovaul admitted that since
the enactment of the s h a r i a, the situation in the
village has become more safe and relaxed,
there have been less thefts and other crimes.
Assessing the implications and the prospects
of the Kirovaul experience however, one should
not overestimate its relevance for other regions
of Dagestan.
The initial success of the s h a r i aÕs enactment
was facilitated by some peculiarities of the
microcosm of the Kirovaul society, such as the
relatively high incipient level of religious feel-
ings; relatively strong tradition of self-govern-
ment typical of mountainous and recently
resettled communities used to settling internal
problems by themselves, without recourse to
official authorities (the element of change is
that the power of Islam has become more pro-
nounced than the power of elders); and the
monoethnic composition of the village which
makes it difficult for the opponents of the
Islamization to hamper it by playing on inter-
ethnic rivalry. Besides, virtually all the Kirovaul
inhabitants are bound by ties of close or distant
blood relations; thus going against the s h a r i a
guard would be tantamount to going against
oneÕs own relatives, which is considered
extremely reprehensible by Caucasian tradi-
t i o n s .
The character of punishments applied and
the list issues regulated by the s h a r i a show that
the scope of Islamization in Kirovaul remains
rather limited. The Islamists confine mostly to
maintaining public order, and so far it is not
even clear how they would handle the issue of
Ôimmoral behaviourÕ and if this implies the
enforcement of the veil and Islamic dress for
women. All socio-economic issues, including
the land ownership disputes that are so crucial
for Dagestan, and political and administrative
issues are regulated by state legislation. Enact-
ment of the s h a r i a does not seem to be a strat-
egy to drive out the state structures as much as
an attempt to fill the security void left by weak
and corrupt authority. 
The fate of Kirovaul will also depend upon
the local IslamistsÕ ability to restrain their ambi-
tions and to take public opinion into account. It
is essential to understand that peopleÕs support
of Islamization is conditional to how much it
meets their social expectations rather than of
any special ideological commitment. If, in their
religious zeal, the Islamists go too far, if people
feel any infringements on their traditional val-
ues and life-style which do not necessarily cor-
respond to some Islamist blueprints, a substan-
tial part of the population risks turning against
the Islamists. As the s h a r i a structures lose their
legitimacy, it will be much easier for the gov-
ernment to split and neutralize the Islamist
forces. Conversely, as the local authorities are
losing faith in assistance from the central gov-
ernment, they may increasingly opt for joining
this protest movement under Islamic slogans.
It is obvious that the Islamization and enact-
ment of the s h a r i a do not necessarily imply
violent, separatist and anti-state inclinations,
as some incidents have shown. The issue of
integrating some Islamic legal regulations into
the legislation of Dagestan, and maybe some
other predominantly Muslim republics of
North Caucasus, should be paid more serious
a t t e n t i o n . '
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